Abstract: Source code attribution classifiers have recently become powerful. We consider the possibility that an adversary could craft code with the intention of causing a misclassification, i.e., creating a forgery of another author's programming style in order to hide the forger's own identity or blame the other author. We find that it is possible for a non-expert adversary to defeat such a system. In order to inform the design of adversarially resistant source code attribution classifiers, we conduct two studies with C/C++ programmers to explore the potential tactics and capabilities both of such adversaries and, conversely, of human analysts doing source code authorship attribution. Through the quantitative and qualitative analysis of these studies, we (1) evaluate a state-of-the-art machine classifier against forgeries, (2) evaluate programmers as human analysts/forgery detectors, and (3) compile a set of modifications made to create forgeries. Based on our analyses, we then suggest features that future source code attribution systems might incorporate in order to be adversarially resistant.
Introduction
With recent publicity surrounding cyber attacks and corresponding investigations into attribution of the attacks, the computer security research community has renewed its attention on authorship attribution of pro- grams. This line of research seeks to answer the following question: given source code (or a binary) of unknown authorship, as well as examples of source code (or binaries) from a set of authors, is it possible to identify the original author of that program? Prior research on this question has shown significant promise -it is possible to attribute the authorship of programs with a high degree of accuracy under realistic assumptions. For example, Caliskan-Islam et al. [5] propose a classifier that achieves 96% accuracy over 250 programmers.
Computer security involves adversaries trying to defeat security mechanisms, and the designers of those security mechanisms seeking to defend against adversaries. We argue that the next phase in the evolution of program authorship attribution is therefore considering potential adversaries -parties seeking to fool authorship attribution systems. Specifically, because strong program authorship attribution systems now exist, albeit not designed for adversarial contexts, we can experimentally explore how adversaries might seek to defeat those systems and whether those adversaries might be successful. This paper explores both the methods that an adversary might use to intentionally subvert an attribution system, as well as a conservative estimate of the adversary's capabilities. By understanding the adversaries' tactics and capabilities, as well as their effect on a (public) state-of-the-art attribution system, our results can inform the design of adversarially resistant authorship attribution systems.
Adversarial Goals. We consider two related goals for an adversary: to create a forgery of another author, and to mask the original author. A successful masking means that an adversary has taken a program by some original author and modified it to conceal the true authorship. A successful forgery means that an adversary has fooled an attribution system into believing that some program was written by a targeted, victim author who did not write the program. A forgery attack is a targeted attack, while a masking attack is untargeted. Security under the latter goal (masking) implies security under the former (forgery) because an adversary able to accomplish forgery will by definition be able to accomplish masking.
For example, consider an attribution system trained on five authors (A-E) with program P a written by au-thor A, and program P a written by author A but modified by an adversary. An adversary launching a forgery attack with P a would have the goal of P a being labeled as written by a specific author, say, C. An adversary launching a masking attack with P a has a goal of P a being labeled as written by any of B, C, D, or E.
Our Forgery Studies. To study the capabilities and methods of an adversary with these goals, we conducted two studies with programmers; specifically, we study forgery attempts, as a successful forgery implies a successful masking. In our first study, the forgery creation study, programmers play the adversary, modifying code to fool a machine classifier. In our second study, the forgery detection study, we present a different set of programmers, acting as human analysts, with a series of attribution tasks over a set of code samples that include forgeries.
With the results of these studies, we then conduct quantitative analyses to explore the potential capabilities of an adversary against both existing classifiers and human analysts; we also conduct qualitative analyses to understand the potential methods of both an adversary creating attacks and a human analyst doing attribution. Finally, we analyze the modifications from the point of view of the machine classifier, to better understand the success of the forgeries and suggest features that future, robust machine classifiers might add.
Both these studies, along with our analysis of the machine classifier, give us a greater richness in our understanding of how people might attempt to create forgeries -as well as a baseline of their success -and provide us with insights on how one might design adversarially robust program authorship attribution systems, including systems that one might design to work with human analysts.
Contributions.
We conduct the first public analysis of the robustness of a state-of-the-art source code authorship attribution system to adversarial attempts at creating forgeries. We also conduct the first, to our knowledge, public study of the efficacy of human analysts at identifying forgeries. The following contributions arise from these experiments and our resulting analyses. -We experimentally evaluate the robustness of a public state-of-the-art attribution system to adversarial attempts at creating forgeries. In doing so, we find that both expert and non-expert programmers can successfully fool the attribution system. -We provide a set of modifications that forgers made to create their forgeries. We also identify the strategies that human analysts (in our study) use to make attribution decisions. -We experimentally evaluate programmers as analysts for source code authorship attribution and forgery detection. We find that forgery detection is difficult for humans as well as for machines, but that humans can adapt their strategies after being warned about adversarial input, without being specifically trained on it. From this analysis, we draw lessons for machines. -We analyze strategies from both the forgers and the analysts, and provide recommendations to the designers of future program authorship attribution systems, in an effort to make them robust against the type of adversaries we consider. -We investigate the effect of the forgeries on the machine classifier and, through this analysis, suggest lessons for future, more robust source code attribution classifiers
Related Work
Natural Language Processing: adversarial stylometry and authorship obfuscation. Authorship attribution is a well-studied topic within the Natural Language Processing (NLP) community. See [25] for a survey. In addition to attributing authorship of written text, the NLP community has recently turned to authorship obfuscation and forgery. Kacmarcik and Gamon [15] explored the idea of purposeful anonymization in NLP, with a focus on quantifying the effort necessary to anonymize against attribution systems. Later, Brennan et al. [4] introduced adversarial stylometry: the notion that authors of natural language text may intentionally obfuscate (mask) their identity, or imitate (forge) another's identity. They asked a group of writers to obfuscate their own writing and then to imitate a famous author, and found that classifiers that typically had high accuracy did poorly on the obfuscated and imitated samples.
Our experiments and goals are similar to those of Brennan et al. [4] , except our domain is source code instead of English. Just as code attribution research borrows ideas from NLP, our research on subverting source code attribution classifiers is both analogous to Brennan et al. [4] and novel within the security community.
Afroz et al. [1] analyzed the data from [4] to identify linguistic features that change when writers are being deceptive about their identities. This work introduced a set of features with which they train a classifier to recognize when an author is hiding their identity. Concurrent work by Juola et al. [14] found similar results.
More recently, Potthast, et al. [20] published a survey of authorship obfuscation and imitation, as well as large scale evaluation of obfuscation techniques and detection algorithms.
Source code attribution. Compared to natural languages, authorship attribution for source code is a much younger field. Early works include Spafford and Weeber [23] , Pellen [19] , Kothari et al. [16] , and Frantzeskou et al. [10] . Recently, Caliskan-Islam et al. [5] improved the state-of-the-art by using a combination of syntactic, lexical, and layout features and achieved higher accuracy over a much larger group of programmers than previous works. We use this classifier when testing the strength of forgeries.
Hayes and Offutt [13] suggest a number of high-level features to distinguish programmers. They find that the most distinguishing features are concerning the occurrence of operators, constructs, and lint warnings. They consider high-level algorithmic and engineering features such as testability and code coverage, but do not find that these features distinguish amongst the five programmers in their study. Our results suggest revisiting these high-level features in the context of forgeries.
Additionally, Dauber et al. [8] develop an ensemble classifier to do highly accurate attribution on short (partial) code samples.
Plagiarism detection for source code. Plagiarism detection is a sub-problem of authorship attribution. MOSS ("Measure Of Software Similarity") [22] , a wellknown publicly available tool, measures the similarity between two sets of source code and outputs a percent match. Forgery and plagiarism are related but also have a clear difference: in plagiarism, multiple instances of the plagiarized program are often available. In forgery and masking, the adversary creates a new program, intending to cause the attribution system to misattribute.
Classifying binaries.
There is also work on attribution of binaries. Rosenblum et al. [21] apply machine learning to style features extracted from binaries; Caliskan-Islam et al. [6] build on this work. Muir and Wikström [17] find that changing compiler settings and linking statically can be used to decrease attribution accuracy and obfuscate authorship on binary attribution classifiers -the only other work, to our knowledge, focused on authorship obfuscation for programs.
Threat Model and Goals
We now elaborate on our goals and underlying threat model, beginning with several motivating scenarios.
Motivating Scenarios
Consider the following scenarios. In each case, the programmer or adversary knows about the existence of program authorship attribution systems but not the details. The adversary is not necessarily malicious, but is always acting adversarially to the attribution system. 1. Forgery. Suppose an adversary wants to insert malicious code into an open-source code repository. One avenue the adversary might take is to obtain the credentials of an established contributor and commit code that introduces a vulnerability. The adversary's goal is to commit code that appears to have come from the legitimate programmer so as to not raise the suspicion of the other contributors to the repository, or trigger any automated alarmsi.e., the adversary seeks to create a forgery. 2. Masking. Suppose that a programmer wants to write and release code for a new digital currency but does not want anyone to know who wrote the program. The history of the Bitcoin digital currency, and its anonymous inventor Satoshi, inspire this scenario [3] . The programmer, desiring privacy, may seek to intentionally modify their code to make it unidentifiable -i.e., to mask their code. 3. Masking. Consider a programmer developing software in a country where censorship is rampant. The programmer wants to develop software that is illegal in that country, such as anti-censorship messaging apps, and may use Tor and other network tools to obfuscate any network indicators. However, the programmer also needs to ensure that the software does not look like it was written by them -i.e., this programmer seeks to mask their code, to protect their anonymity. This example is inspired by Saeed Malekpour [26] , an Iranian web developer sentenced to death for writing photo sharing software used to distribute pornography. 4. Forgery. Suppose now that an adversary wants to make it appear that a programmer developed anticensorship software. The adversary, perhaps a work colleague or someone with access to software that the intended victim had written, e.g., via Git, mod-ifies their own code to look like the victim's, and the victim is blamed. This represents a forgery attack.
In any of these scenarios, the adversaries may either write their own code or modify code written by others, depending on their skill levels and access to code that already fulfills their purpose.
Threat Model
As captured in the preceding scenarios, we consider two key (related) adversarial goals. We next elaborate on our assumptions, drawn from our goal of developing a conservative estimate of an adversary's capabilities.
Training set. First, we assume that both the adversary and the attribution system have labeled samples of code written by the original and target author (if a forgery attack). Both parties may have samples from other authors, i.e., the classifier may be trained on multiple authors. We assume the training set contains no forgeries.
Classifier. We assume that the only information available to the attribution system are the programs in question: network traces, memory dumps of machines, etc., could help detect authorship but are orthogonal to our study of source code attribution.
Adversary skill. We assume adversaries with a solid, but not necessarily expert, knowledge of the language used by the authors (C/C++ in our case), and no specific training on forgery, masking, or attribution. We think it advantageous to begin with the simple case (in this case, experienced but not expert programmers): if even these adversaries can fool a state-of-the-art attribution system, then the attribution system will likely be vulnerable to more sophisticated adversaries, and a less sophisticated attribution system will probably be more vulnerable to the same adversaries.
Adversary's knowledge of the classifier. We assume that the adversary lacks specific knowledge about the classifier in question, e.g., classification algorithm, features, size, or contents of training set. This assumption gives the classifier the greatest power and likelihood of success even in the face of an adversary.
Goals
Informed by these motivating scenarios and qualified by the bounds of our threat model, we present our goals as a series of guiding questions: 
Classifier and Data
Before discussing our methodology, we give background information on the classifier we use and our data set.
State of the art classifier. To facilitate the exploration of our goals, we needed a classifier against which to test forgeries. Industry attribution systems, to the extent that they exist, are proprietary, with little public knowledge of their capabilities or methods. We therefore focused on a publicly available attribution system. A clear choice for a state-of-the-art code stylometry classifier was the classifier introduced by CaliskanIslam et al. [5] , since it achieved remarkable increases in accuracy over prior work on source code attribution. This model performs attribution on C/C++ code by extracting lexical, layout, and syntactic features, which are derived from an abstract syntax tree of the code.
We replicated Caliskan-Islam et al.'s setup with the open source version of the classifier available at [7] and followed their directions to set up using the Code Stylometry Feature Set. As they did, we used Weka's implementation of a Random Forest with 300 trees.
Dataset. For consistency, we used the same dataset as Caliskan-Islam et al. [5] , Google Code Jam (GCJ) [11], a programming competition. GCJ invites participants to code to solve a series of problems. GCJ data is wellsuited for code stylometry and authorship attribution work because each program is guaranteed to be singleauthor and it provides a body of functionally equivalent programs as solved by different authors. However, the programs differ from much code in the wild because there are no style guidelines and the code is not meant to be maintained or used over long periods, unlike much professionally developed software. We used GCJ despite this difference because it is consistent with previous work and provided our participants with functionally equivalent programs from which to learn authors' styles.
We used C code because the classifier is built to attribute C code. The dataset consisted of 8661 programs from 3940 authors (averaging 2.2 each), but we primarily used code from the five authors with the most files: 214 total, or an average of 42.8 files each. Data Modification. The forgery creation study aimed to understand the methods and capabilities of potential adversaries. A secondary goal was respecting participants' time. Pilot experiments showed participants created forgeries by making many tedious typographical modifications and then losing interest and motivation.
To encourage participants to focus on other modifications, we normalized typographical style to a large extent by running all code though a code linter, astyle [2], a simple static analyzer and code beautifier. By doing this, we support our goal of understanding sophisticated methods of forging and attribution rather than methods that would be obliterated by a linter.
Our Classifiers. We created a suite of three training sets on which this classifier achieved high accuracy in order to (1) give the classifier an advantage where possible and realistic and (2) allow us to discuss general trends over training sets.
The three training sets differ by the number of authors in the sets: 5, 20, and 50. We name them accordingly as C 5 , C 20 , and C 50 . All classifiers include data from the five authors with the most files; additional authors are chosen randomly from those with at least five files (to ensure sufficient training data). We chose the five most prolific authors because we wanted to give the classifier as much training data as possible in order to give it an advantage over the forgers. Table 1 gives the precision and recall of each classifier.
Although we mirrored Caliskan-Islam et al.'s methodology until this point, here we differ. CaliskanIslam et al. constructed training sets that had equal amounts of code from each author in the training set to investigate how the amount of training data affects attribution success; for our goals, we wanted to have a classifier with as high accuracy as possible in order to obtain a conservative estimate of adversarial success. We achieve this by not withholding training data from any author and creating forgeries of the five most prolific authors. We did not control the number of training files per author, as downsampling would not improve classification accuracy or fairness.
Additionally, we remove all programs that we gave participants as a possible starting point for forgeries, a small subset of all code by each author. We remove these files from the training sets because these original files are similar to the forgeries created.
Methodology
This section explains our design decisions for the studies and presents a summary of participants' demographics.
We refer to the author or authors that we asked a participant to focus on as 'X', 'Y', and 'notX'. Recall that there are five possible authors, A-E, so five possible values for each X and Y. 'notX' takes on the value of the other four authors; for example, if 'X' is author B, then 'notX' is the combination of A, C, D, and E. Additionally, participants in the forgery creation study compared different author pairs: some compared authors A and E while others compared B and C (and so on).
Running studies that explored all possible combinations of authors and participant skill with the number of choices of code to forge and attribute would have proven prohibitively large. Given the lack of prior work on code style forgery, our intentions were two-fold: 1) develop a conservative estimate of adversarial capabilities by measuring forgeries against a state-of-the-art machine classifier, and, 2) qualitatively analyze the methods used to forge and attribute, as well as the effects they had on the features extracted by the machine classifier.
We designed and conducted both studies with the ethical considerations required when working with human participants. Our institution's human subjects institutional review board approved both studies. Neither study asked participants to incur any risk greater than normal while programming or reading code.
Forgery Creation Study Design
In our forgery creation study, we conducted sessions with 28 programmers, who produced 29 forgery attempts (one participant misunderstood the instructions and created two forgeries). We excluded two forgeries because they differed dramatically from the original code in functionality, which was explicitly against the instructions. Thus, we have 27 total forgeries.
The tasks in this study were: 1. Train. Given code from two authors, X and Y (chosen from authors A-E), compare functionally equivalent code by both authors to learn the authors' styles. Participants were not told how to think about style, but they did know that subsequent tasks would ask them to attribute and forge. 2. Attribute. Attribute 10 new samples of code to either X or Y. We asked participants to: (1) give an attribution decision, (2) indicate their confidence on a scale of 1-10, (3) briefly state their reasoning. 3. Forge. Modify code written by one author to look like it was written by the other author. We asked participants to imagine the best possible classifier: human, machine, or some combination thereof. Participants chose whether to forge X's style or Y's. In this task, we learn the level of success after participants think they have made enough transformations to fool a classifier -i.e., the capabilities of an adversary with no information about a classifier. 4. Forge with Oracle. Test the forgeries from the previous step against the classifiers. Participants then continued to modify their forgeries until all versions of the classifier produced the target misclassification, or until they chose to stop. The purpose of this task was to encourage participants to continue making more transformations if their first forgeries did not fool all the classifiers.
Forgery Detection Study Design
Our forgery detection study used the forgeries created in our forgery creation study (Section 5.1) to explore both the success of programmers as attribution analysts and the methods used to successfully detect forgeries. This study had 21 participants. We gave the participants no specific instructions concerning attribution or forgery detection, since we did not want to bias their attribution methods with our preexisting knowledge of the forgeries. At first, participants were not aware that this study was about forgeries.
Participants completed the following tasks, in which they acted as an analyst looking to detect forgeries of a certain author, X; X varied between authors A-D (we did not receive enough forgeries of E): 1. Train. Given code from the same five authors used in the forgery creation study, with four of the authors combined to be 'notX', and the remaining author as 'X', learn the style of author 'X'. As in the forgery creation study, there were two examples of each problem, and there were no forgeries in the training set. Participants did know that there were multiple authors in the 'notX' category. We trained participants on one author versus all the others, a departure from the training phase in the forgery cre-ation study, because we thought it would be easier for participants completing these tasks to focus on only one author's style -i.e., the one being forged. 2. Simple attribution. Given 12 new samples of code, answer the question "who wrote this code?" With possible answers 'X' and 'notX', random guessing would be expected to achieve 50% accuracy. Four of the 12 samples were written by X, and eight were written by one of the notX authors. Of the eight, four were forgeries of X, and four were not. We count a 'notX' label on 'forgery of X' as correct, and an 'X' label incorrect, as the task was to identify the person who wrote the code. 3. Attribution with knowledge of forgery. Attribute the same set of 12 samples again, with the knowledge that some may be forgeries. Possible answers were 'X', 'notX', and 'forgery of X'. In this task, random guessing would be expected to achieve 44%, as there are two correct labels for a forgery of X: both 'notX' (the original author) and 'forgery of X' (a forgery detection) are correct, since either would be a win from a classifier. 4. Find the forgery. Given 3 or 4 pairs of functionally equivalent programs side by side, one written by author X and the other a forgery of author X, decide which is the forgery.
Recruitment and Demographics
Recruitment. For both studies, we required participants to self-report a good working knowledge of C/C++. As we elaborate below, participants in the forgery-creation study were a mix of undergraduate Computer Science students and current or former professional software developers. Participants in our forgery detection study were primarily upper-level undergraduates and graduate students in Computer Science. No one participated in both studies.
Demographics. Of the 28 forgery creation participants, 10 were students, 16 were professional computer scientists, and two were unemployed or had an occupation unrelated to computer science. Of the 21 forgery detection participants, 14 were students, and three were professional computer scientists. We also asked participants to report experience as a professional C/C++ programmer. Although the forgery creation participants were, in general, more experienced with programming, we can compare the relative skill levels of the two groups at attribution specifically by comparing their performance on the two attribution tasks: the attribution task in the forgery creation study ( Step 2 in Section 5.1) was nearly identical to the simple attribution task in the forgery detection study ( Step 2 in Section 5.2), if we count attribution decisions on only non-forgeries. Despite their demographic differences, both groups of participants attained high accuracy on these tasks, suggesting that they were similarly skilled at thinking about programming style.
Quantitative Results
We now turn to our results regarding the capabilities of both the participants in the forgery study (the forgers) and the participants in the forgery detection study (the analysts). Broadly, we find that the forgeries created by our participants, who had no specific training in forgery creation, are largely successful against machine classifiers and human analysts. However, when analysts are told to look for forgeries, forgery success decreases rapidly, suggesting that future, robust attribution systems should learn from the strategies that the human analysts developed. In this section, we refer to success as the success of the forgery attacks, not the success of the classifier.
Deceptibility of machine classifier
We find that the current state-of-the-art machine classifier [5] -though it achieves high accuracy on large numbers of programmers -is not robust to forgery attempts. The ability of adversaries to defeat this classifier is perhaps unsurprising given that the classifier was not designed to be robust against adversaries. However, we find it informative to study whether it actually fails with adversarial input in practice and (later) evaluate both how people created those forgeries and how the forgeries affected the machine classifier features in order to inform the design of future, adversarially-robust classifiers. Initial forgery attempts. Table 2 shows the percent of forgery attempts that yielded successful forgeries or masks against the machine classifiers. On the forgers' first try, 61.1% of forgery attempts were successful forgery attacks, and 73.3% of forgery attempts resulted in successful masks. (Recall that forgery is a subset of masking, so successful mask attempts include all successful forgery attempts).
Final forgery attempts. Table 3 shows that 70.0% of final forgery attempts were successful, and 80.0% of final attempts were successful as masking attacks. That is, for 80.0% of final forgery attempts, the classifier did not identify the original author, meaning that the average accuracy of the classifier on the forgeries was 20.0%.
Training data variation: number of authors. The percentage of successful attacks increases with the number of authors in the classifier's training; in our data, the percent of successful forgery attacks increases from 66.6% on C 5 to 73.3% on C 50 . Similarly, masking attacks increase from 76.6% to 86.6% on the same classifiers. We expect that as the number of authors in the classifier's training set rises, the ease of masking would continue to rise, while the ease of forging would depend on the strength of the classifier's model of the target author.
Training data variation: presence of unmodified forgeries. Recall, from Section 4, that the training sets did not contain the original files from which the forgeries were created. We also test the forgeries against three classifiers trained on the same authors, but with the addition of the original forgery files, so the classifiers have access to all authors' entire body of work. Intuitively, forgeries have a lower level of success when attacking these versions of the classifier: forgery success is 65.6% overall, and masking is 73.3% (down from 70.0% and 80.0%, respectively). This implies that the classifier has a better chance of recognizing the original author if the actual original file is in its training set.
Success against human analysts
The results of our forgery creation study, detailed in Section 6.1, reveal that an adversary can deceive the Recall, from Section 5.2, that in the forgery detection study, participants had no knowledge of the forgeries in the simple attribution task, and later knew that there might be forgeries present in the next task, the attribution-with-knowledge-of-forgery task. The final task, find-the-forgery, presented participants with two functionally equivalent programs, and instructed them to determine which one was the forgery. Table 4 summarizes the rate of success of forgery attacks in each of the attribution tasks.
We find that attack success decreases dramatically in the second task, after participants are told about the possibility of forgeries. We also find that humans and machines are not always fooled by the same forgeries.
Simple attribution task results. In the simple attribution task, the forgeries fooled the humans 56.6% of the time, meaning that the participants' accuracy on forgery was statistically equivalent to random guessing. This indicates that in this task, when participants had no reason to expect that some of the programs were forgeries, they were often fooled by the forgeries (as was the machine classifier). The attribution accuracy on nonforgeries attained by the participants, 92.7%, is high.
Attribution-with-knowledge-of-forgery task results. In the attribution-with-knowledge-of-forgery task (Step 3 in Section 5.2), forgery attack success decreases drastically, to 23.7%. That is, participants were able to correctly detect 76.3% of forgeries. This dramatic drop in forgery success shows that when analysts are made aware of the possibility of forgery, they are more likely to accurately detect or attribute forgeries. However, although many forgeries were correctly detected, a number of code samples attributed as forgeries were not ac-tually forgeries: where previously the analysts correctly attributed non-forgeries with 92.7% accuracy, they only achieved 76.2% accuracy on non-forgeries in this task. This can be attributed to increased suspicion about inconsistencies in every program, as participants noted.
Find-the-forgery task results. The third and final task of the study presented participants with two functionally equivalent programs, one written by X, and the other a forgery attempt of X solving the same problem. Success on this task was 53.1% overall, statistically equivalent to random guessing (50%). However, the results were not random: some forgeries consistently fooled the humans while others tended to be detected. Furthermore, although some forgeries in this task fooled the participants, they were not strictly the same forgeries that fooled the machine classifiers, or that fooled the participants in the previous task.
Lessons
Our results enable us to draw the following lessons regarding the capabilities of forgers and analysts: 1. The current state-of-the-art attribution classifier [5] is not robust to adversarial stylometry attacks, even when those attacks are created by non-experts. This suggests that other source code attribution classifiers may be vulnerable to the same type of attacks. 2. Training sets matter: classifiers trained on fewer authors are more robust, and classifiers that have the original, unmodified files in their training sets are more robust. This suggests having a variety of training sets on which to test new code. 3. Augmenting attribution systems with human analysts, though expensive, may increase the success of the overall system's forgery detection and attribution capabilities. Attribution analysts are subject to the same attacks that machine classifiers are, but they may be sensitive to different attack strategies. 4. Telling the analysts about the potential adversarial input was enough to significantly increase forgery detection, though the increased suspicion caused non-forgeries to be marked as forgeries. Attribution systems employing human analysts should consider how to train analysts to increase the rate of forgery detection without decreasing attribution accuracy. 5. Some forgeries fooled all the machine classifiers and many or all of the humans. Others fooled all the machine classifiers and none of the humans, and others still fooled many or all of the humans, but none of the machine classifiers. Forgeries that fool all the classifiers, human and machine, are the best forgeries. However, the small number of forgeries the fool either humans or machines but not both suggests two things: (1) that as the quality of the forgery declines, it may only fool some of the classifiers, but we cannot say which ones; and (2) some forgeries are easier for different classifiers or people to recognize.
Qualitative Results
To understand how to improve forgery detection, we first analyze forgeries to understand the changes forgers made. Second, we analyze the participants' notes from the attribution phases in both studies to understand how they thought about author style, attribution, and forgery detection.
Forgery Creation
Implementation involves three types of decisions: typographic, control structure, and information structure [12, 18] . We further divide modifications into local, or implementation-level changes, and higher-level algorithmic changes. These categories exist on a continuum, but we define them roughly as follows: if one were implementing a program from pseudocode, a local modification would not be visible in the pseudocode, whereas an algorithmic change would be a departure from the pseudocode. For example, imagine pseudocode for a nested loop, along with the accompanying source code. In the source code, modifying the type of loop -i.e., for to while -would be a local control flow modification, since it does not affect the pseudocode, but control flow keywords are modified. Abstracting the inner loop to a helper function would be an algorithmic control flow modification, since it would affect the underlying pseudocode. The current state-of-the-art classifier [5] achieves high accuracy on non-adversarial input. However, our participants -without knowing what features the classification algorithm was using -modified code in such a way that they were able to fool the classifiers using only these local modifications, suggesting that local code features are not sufficient for an attribution system that may receive adversarial input. Section 8 explores the how these local code modifications affect the machine classifier features.
Next, we detail the types of changes made to forgeries, citing examples from the studies. First, we present an overview of the most common types of modifications; then we explore specific changes using the examples shown in Figures 1, 2, 3 , and 4. Appendix A contains the entire list of modifications. Table 5 shows the most popular modifications, ranked by the number of participants who made at least one such modification. Changing variable names, variable declaration location, and libraries imported are local information structure modifications (Section 7.1.3), and modifying the indentation scheme is a typographical change (Section 7.1.2).
Most Common Changes
Copying entire lines of code written by the target author in the training set may be either a control flow or an information structure change: often, participants copied the logic of the main loop (control flow modification) and variable declarations for variables used globally or at a high level in the main function (information structure modification), suggesting that participants considered file-or function-level variables and loop logic and structure an essential marker of style.
Typographical Changes
Recall from Section 4 that the code given to participants had been normalized typographically to a large extent. Many participants still made some typographical changes, though some typographical modifications may not have been intentional if participants were working in an IDE that enforced a certain style. There is no way to determine which modifications were not deliberate, so we include all modifications in our analysis.
The most common typographical modifications were the usage or location of brackets and the indentation scheme, while less common modifications were comments and spacing between operators. Figure 1 illustrates some of these modifications. In this originalforgery pair, the forger added brackets, newlines, and spaces between operators to transform the code to look more like the target author's code. These modifications make the code look significantly different at first glance, but in reality these modifications could be easily automated with a code linter.
Information Structure Changes
Information structure changes cover variables, syntax, and data flow. Local modifications include changing the variable name or declaration location, ternary operator usage, and macro addition and removal. Algorithmic changes, which no participants made, would include modifications to the variable type, data structure usage, and static and dynamic memory usage.
Nearly all participants modified variable names and the location of variable declarations, typically either from or to a global variable, or inside a for-loop instantiation. Participants also frequently added or removed macros, libraries included (more often added), and swapped equivalent API calls, typically for I/O. Less common modifications were syntactic, such as ternary operator usage, the increment/decrement operator, and array indexing. The transformation in Figure 2 illustrates changes to variable names, API calls (specifically, this occurred with I/O functions), and the addition of macros used by the target author. Figures 1 and 2 show modified variable names.
Control Flow Changes
Control flow modifications relate to the path of execution in a program. Local modifications include modifying the loop type, loop logic (i.e., increment to decrement), putting multiple assignments per line, breaking up a complex if-statement, and adding or removing control flow keywords. Algorithmic modifications include refactoring functions and any major addition or removal of control structures like loops and conditionals.
The majority of the control flow changes to forgeries are implemented as local modifications. Most common are changes to loop type or logic, breaking up an ifstatement, and the addition or removal of control flow keywords (with minimal modifications to the surrounding algorithm). We do find some algorithmic changes, though they are much less common than the local modifications: some participants added or removed inlined versions of memset or common math functions. One participant undertook a major refactoring of a helper function; we highlight this unusual but impressive series of modifications after discussing local modifications. Control flow: local changes. Figure 2 illustrates local control flow modifications. Most prevalent is the addition or removal of control flow keywords, like break, continue, assert. This may be because it is often trivial to add or remove them by locally modifying the logic. The modified code snippet in Figure 2 begins by adding macros for for-loops that the imitated author frequently used. Then, the loop type of the inner forloop (original line 51, modified line 48) is changed to use the macro. The modified version also removes a newline so that both the loop initialization and body are on the same line, without brackets. The loop type of the main loop (original line 48, modified line 46) is changed from a for-loop to a while-loop. The logic of the main loop is also modified: in the modified version, the counter decreases; in the original version, the counter increases. The input functions at original lines 47/50 and modified lines 45/48 have been changed to use scanf instead of cin. Finally, some entire lines (44-46) in the modified version have been copied from programs written by the target author.
Control flow: algorithmic changes. Control flow changes that modify the underlying algorithm reflect a deeper understanding of both the original and target programmers' thought processes and goals. Only a few participants made these types of changes -for example, refactoring a function, replacing a goto with a non-trivial series of conditionals, or adding or removing inlined version of common math functions. Figures 3  and 4 show an example of inlining: the participant removes a call to memset (original line 21) and replaces it with an inlined version (modified line 41), a double loop through the array where each element is set to 256, as in the original version. This type of modification occurs in a few other forgeries and also signifies a more significant change to the path of execution, though it only requires only a local understanding of the code. A more unusual, higher-level algorithmic modification in Figures 3 and 4 is the addition of a helper function, showing deep analysis of the algorithm. To create this forgery, the participant made significant changes to the function judge, primarily by adding temp variables and abstracting away much of the logic in the complex if-statements in the original code (lines 11-13) to a new helper function, called copy_maybe. These changes would require a forger to understand the function as a whole. This is the only forgery that shows a forger delving slightly deeper in the design choices made by both the original and target authors. The participant who created this forgery wrote that "it required understanding the code more deeply than just at a stylistic level and trying to rewrite it from scratch."
Features Used for Attribution
Through analysis of our study results, we find that analysts focus primarily on local implementation details instead of algorithmic decisions when making attribution decisions, just as the forgers focused on these when creating forgeries. That is, participants overwhelmingly use the same set of features when trying to detect forgeries, but augment this set with higher-level reasoning about stylistic inconsistencies and the forgeability of features.
These can be roughly divided into inconsistencies regarding the presence of a feature and inconsistencies regarding use of a feature. For example, imagine an author typically uses the variable name aa in their main loops, as seen in the training set. In a forgery, a presence inconsistency would be the lack of a variable named aa. A usage inconsistency would be a variable named aa used in a helper function and not in the main loop. Noticing a usage inconsistency requires the analyst to have a greater understanding of the author's style.
Presence of features.
The inconsistent inclusion or exclusion of a feature indicative of the target author led participants to label code a forgery. Although noting these inconsistencies sometimes resulted in a correct label, it was not a reliable technique, as we discuss below.
A common reason for a correct forgery label was inconsistencies in spacing and bracket use. The success of these low-level typographic inconsistencies (in combination with the other features) may be attributed, to some extent, to the fact that style in the training set was largely normalized, but we made no normalizations to the forgeries because they reflect the forgers' idea of what will fool a classifier. So, if the forger did not attempt to imitate typographic style at all, the participant may have discerned typographical differences.
Sometimes, however, typographical inconsistencies lead to an incorrect label: participants wrote, about non-forgeries, that "everything matches except there is a for loop missing its braces"; and "the discrepancies, particularly the multiple for-loop statements on the same line, make me think it's a forgery."
Other participants justified the forgery label with anomalies in the code, or features that match or might have been copied from the target author's training set: "The use of unsigned long is something B never did in the training data however the overall structure of the code looks like it could be from person B. Maybe this person didn't understand the difference between unsigned long and long and blindly copied over from code that used unsigned long's?"
Conversely, participants labeled as non-forgeries code that contained features consistently present in the training set. One participant wrote that the code "uses _ and __, asserts, has no inconsistencies with D's style", and assigned a 'X' label to a forgery of X. In both this example and the previous one, participants who based attribution decisions on the inconsistent presence of features assigned incorrect labels.
Forgeability of Features.
Some participants reasoned about the fact that typographical and local features would be easy to forge but still falsely decided the code was not a forgery: "For me this looked like D because of the asserts and curly braces, but it would be pretty easy to add those things in an attempted forgery...." Similarly, another participant noted that the addition of simple macros would be trivial to add but assigned a non-forgery label because of the lack of unused variables. This shows that participants thought about the process of forgery creation -that is, that the addition of local and typographical features is simple -but sometimes still came to the wrong decision.
Usage of features. Some participants assigned correct forgery labels because they noticed features not used as the target author had. Higher-level features that participants used to detect forgeries include differences in modularity of the code, use of helper functions, and lines that appear in the training set, all inconsistencies in the usage of features.
A This participant noted three simple features -variable names, function length, and libraries -and combined information about higher-level indicators (like typical variable names) with variable usage and information flow to discover inconsistencies in the usage of certain elements.
Lessons
Stepping back, we are now positioned to draw some key implications and lessons regarding the potential tactics and methods of forgers and analysts: 1. When creating forgeries, forgers may copy code from other programs written by the target of the forgery. This code, while visible in the source, might not actually be executed when the program is run. Therefore, an adversarially resilient attribution system might use a software analysis tool to determine which portions of code are reachable or unreachable and then treat these regions of code differently.
2. The vast majority of modifications made to create forgeries required only a local understanding of the code, and were made by forgers who had no knowledge of the features that the classifier was using for attribution. This suggests that forgeries in the wild, to the extent that they exist, might contain the same types of local modifications. 3. When told about forgeries, but without being shown examples, some participants developed reliable methods of forgery detection. These arose from the participants first considering how forgeries might be created and then developing an understanding of the target author's style at a higher level than the modifications that the forger made. This suggests that attribution system designers should aim to develop a high level understanding of authorship style. 4. Taken together, the previous two lessons suggest that adversarially resistant attribution systems might incorporate algorithmic features which require a deeper understanding of the target author's engineering process and programmatic goals.
Discussion
To extend the results in Sections 6 and 7, we analyze the features modified by the forgers, and then summarize our recommendations for a more robust classifier.
Machine Classifier Feature Analysis
To better understand the high rate of forgery success against the machine classifier, we explore the machine classifier's features. Each forgery has an associated original file that the forger modified to create the forgery;
we compare the features and analyze how the modifications made by the forgers affected the features that the machine classifier extracted. In this section, we are specifically discussing machine classifier features, not 'features' used by the forgers or analysts.
Overview of classifier features. Caliskan-Islam et al's [5] classifier extracts features from an abstract syntax tree (AST) representation of the code. Leaf nodes of the AST are unigrams of code: variable names, API calls, strings, and literals (as well as C keywords). AST nodes are snippets of the syntactic structure of code, such as 'AdditiveExpression' or 'ForInit'. The classifier traverses the AST to extract AST unigrams and bigrams. For an in-depth explanation, see [5] . On average, for classifier C 5 , 55.0% of features include a variable name, API call, macro, or literal. By making small, local changes to only variable names, macros, literals, or API calls, forgers had access to over half of the features. Recall from Section 7.1 that swapping variable names was the most common modification that forgers made, and they also commonly modified macros and API calls: these modifications had the potential to alter half the features extracted from the file. Figure 5 shows an overview of the proportion of features shared between the original and the forgery. On average, 49.4% of features extracted by the machine classifier from original file are absent in the corresponding forgery, meaning that the forgers' modifications completely removed any instances of nearly half of the features. Similarly, 40.2% of the features in a forgery do not exist in the original file. The type of features that exist in only one file are proportional to the overall feature makeup, meaning that forgers affected both a large percentage and variety of features: although forgers primarily made modifications to originals that did not require a high-level understanding of the authors' decisions, they were still able to affect a vast majority and variety of features, in line with the high rate of forgery success against the classifier.
Overview of changes to features.
The small circle contained in the overlapping middle portion of Figure 5 shows the proportion of features whose values remained the same throughout the change: 43.0% of the features that exist in both files. Combined with the features that were added to the forgery, this means that of the features in the forgery, only 23.5% have the same value as they did in the original. So, by making primarily local changes, forgers created forgeries that contained 76.5% features with different values.
Next, we take a deeper look at the features whose values change most dramatically. Adding or removing many instances of a feature changes its value more. For example, a forger who changes all while-loops to forloops will increase the value of certain features (such as the AST node 'ForInit') more than a forger who only changes one while loop.
Features that exist in only one of the files. We both examine features removed from original files and features added to forgeries. Table 6 shows the most commonly added and removed features for authors A-D (there were not enough forgeries of author E). The majority of these features are variable names or macros, reflecting the modifications that forgers made to variable names and macros.
There are also AST unigrams such as 'ShiftExpression', 'UnaryOp', 'ArrayIndexing', and 'AssignmentExpr', which are typically close to the leaf nodes and thus more susceptible to local code changes. Moreover, these AST nodes indicate low level programming decisions, such as the use of a bitshift operator, or the choice to use array indexing rather than pointer addition to access array elements. There are only two AST bigrams that appear in these highly-changed features. 'ExpressionStatement AssignmentExpression' indicates assigning value to a variable, perhaps because the forger broke up multiline statements. 'ForInit IdentifierDeclStatement' indicates that the forger added variable declarations immediately after for-loops, another common modification. The AST bigrams sometimes capture programmatic elements across more than one line of programming, but even when they do -as with 'ForInit IdentifierDeclStatement' -they do not capture the higher level observations that participants made about the use of features rather than the presence of features.
Features that exist in both files. We now examine the features that exist in both files but have a high cumulative change in value between original and forgery files. Table 7 sorts these features by type and author. In contrast to features that only exist in one file, these con- Table 6 . These are features that most often occur in either the original by an author, or the forgery of that author, but not both. Table 7 . These features often occur in both a forgery and its corresponding original, with the highest cumulative change in value.
Feature Description
tain no leaf nodes other than common variable names and literals used by most programmers. The majority of the features are AST unigrams. Two of the AST nodes are typically relatively high in the AST: 'ExpressionStatement' and 'Condition'. A change in the value of 'ExpressionStatement', a relatively generic AST node, could indicate that the forger has expanded or contracted lines of code, or simply changed the length of the program, in part by adding or removing lines of code that are expression statements. Forgeries were commonly different lengths than the corresponding original files. A change in the value of 'Condition' may reflect that some forgers trivially added or removed if-statements.
One of the most popular AST unigrams, 'Argument' occurs for each argument in a function call, so its value will change if the forger uses equivalent API calls that have a different number of arguments, another common modification we observed. The rest of the AST node names are self explanatory and reflect code modifications that occur on one line only.
Combined with the features that occur in only one file, we observe that the features highly affected by forgers' changes are variable names and AST unigrams, typically nodes close to the leaf nodes. As shown in Figure 5 , these are 76.5% of the features in the forgery. We now briefly turn our attention to the 23.5% of features that typically do not change in value between the original and the forgery.
There are only two features that occur in all original-forgery pairs and never change value. They are: AST -AST bigram 'FunctionDefinition CompoundStatement', and 'Max depth of AST leaf'. There is a long tail of features that stay constant in the one file in which they appear, primarily AST -AST and leaf -AST bigrams. Along with the high rate of feature modification, this long tail indicates that the machine classifier features are not unforgeable, and that a future, more robust machine classifier should extract features that are more difficult for forgers to modify.
Lessons
Based on our analysis of how the forgers affected the machine classifier's features, we draw the following lessons. 1. Over half of the machine classifier features included variable names, macros, literals, or API calls. Because these are typically simple to change by hand -and even to automate -we suggest that future classifiers should consider fewer of these features, or that these features could be contextualized with their usage in the program, as successful human analysts did in Section 7.2.
2. AST bigrams can capture some information about higher level programming decisions. Although these are not unforgeable, they may be a valuable part of a more robust classifier. 3. Combined with our finding from Section 7.3 that thinking about the forgeability of code properties helped analysts correctly label forgeries, we reiterate that the unchanged machine classifier features are not unforgeable and that the same common strategies that changed other features could modify them. This suggests that future, more robust classifiers may benefit from extracting new features that are not affected by the local modification strategies that the forgers employed, for example by including more complex AST features or by including forgeries (correctly labeled) in the training set.
Conclusion
We conduct two studies with C/C++ programmers in order to better understand the potential capabilities and methods of (1) adversaries creating forgery attacks, and (2) machine classifiers and human analysts trying to attribute source code which may have been modified by an adversary. Through our forgery creation and detection studies, we find that programmers not specifically trained in attribution or forgery can, in many cases, fool a state-ofthe-art source code attribution system. This work therefore provides a conservative estimate of the success of more skilled or trained adversaries.
We find that successful forgeries primarily contain modifications that required the forger to have only a local understanding of the code, and that human analysts who successfully detected forgeries understood style at a higher level than the modifications, suggesting that future adversarially robust attribution systems should additionally include features that capture high-level style.
This work additionally paves the way for follow-on research, such as research in which participants modify their own code to look like a target's style, or research in which forgeries are included in the training set.
This work, an exploration of the capabilities and methods of adversaries seeking to forge another programmer's style, is a starting point for the design of future adversarially resistant attribution systems. The designers of such systems should consider the lessons and implications detailed here, and build systems resilient to even more sophisticated forgery and masking attacks.
A All Modifications
In Section 7.1 we discuss the set of modifications that participants made in our forgery creation study. In this appendix (Table 8) , we provide the complete list of the different classes of modifications. This table splits modifications into three categories: control flow, information structure, and typographical. See Section 7.1 for additional discussions.
